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THE ADVANCE FEE PAYMENT DILEMMA: 
SHOULD PAYMENTS BE DEPOSITED TO 
THE CLIENT TRUST ACCOUNT OR TO 
THE GENERAL OFFICE ACCOUNT? 
Lester Brickman * 
A lawyer possessing client property is acting in a fiduciary capac­
ity.' If the property is in the form of funds, fiduciary safeguards man­
date the deposit of the funds to a client trust account—a requirement 
that has occasioned a considerable volume of disciplinary proceedings 
against lawyers.̂  Disciplinary Rule 9-102 of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility ("DR 9-102"), entitled "Preserving Identity of Funds 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. The author 
wishes to express his appreciation to his research assistants, Irving Cohen and Nancy Sindell, 
who have made important contributions to this article. , ̂  
1 See /« « Caplan, 59 A.D.2d 42, 397 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1977); In re Iverson, 51 A.D.2d 422, 
381 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1976). 
2 A client trust account is a separately maintained bank account that 
must be identified as a client or trust account and cannot be the account tnain-
tained for a lawyer's law firm or other business purposes Funds of all clients 
can generaUy be deposited in the same trust account, in which case adequate 
records must be maintained of each client's interest in the account. 
C. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 4.8, at 179-80 (1986). 
3 [Tjhere were more than 800 disbarments and suspensions nationally between the 
years 1980 and 1985 as a result of violations of attorney tmst accounts. The 
wrongs include misappropriation of client funds, poor or inadequate record keep­
ing, embezzlement or theft of client funds, conversion of client property, commin­
gling, and poor accounting of client funds. 
Weston, Speaking of Ethics, Killing an Ant with a Sledgehammer, 4 Compleat Law. 49, 49 
(1987) (citing the American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility National 
Discipline Data Bank). See Austem, Ethics, 20 Trial 16, 16 (1984) (trust accounts present 
potentially serious disciplinary problems for lawyers); Kurzer, Coleman, Leiter & Trager, At­
torneys' Trust Accounts-Rules and Pitfalls, 55 Fla. B.J. 355, 356 (1981) [hereinafter Kurzer] 
("A large number of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers—including disbarment in some 
cases—stem from the mishandling of client funds."). 
4 Disciplinary Rule 9-102 states in pertinent part that: 
(A) All funds of chents paid to a lawyer . . . , other than advances for costs and 
expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts ... and no 
funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as 
follows; 
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentidly to 
the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the portion belonging to 
the lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the 
lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the 
disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved. 
(B) A lawyer shall: 
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and Property of a Client," codifies several fiduciary standards: it re­
quires an attorney to deposit client funds in a trust account, to avoid 
commingling client funds with the attorney's funds, and to account to 
the client for the funds.' Commingling, which is regarded as a serious 
offense,^ occurs when an attorney intermingles his client's funds with 
his own, depriving the funds of their separate identity and facilitating 
their subjection to the attorney's personal use and to the claims of the 
attorney's creditors.' Funds in which both the client and the attorney 
have a proprietary interest, such as proceeds from a contingent fee 
settlement or award, must also be placed in the client account until 
the interests are severed.® 
The requirements codified by DR 9-102 are imposed only if the 
funds belong at least in part to the client; thus, when an attorney first 
receives funds, a determination as to their nature and ownership must 
be made.' If the funds are solely the attorney's property, they must be 
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities, or other 
properties. 
(2) Identify and labelsecurities and properties of a client promptly .... 
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of 
a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate ac­
counts to his client regarding them. 
(4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, 
securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client 
is entitled to receive. 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 9-102 (1980) [hereinafter Model 
Code]. Model Rule 1.15, Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983) [hereinafter Model 
Rules], corresponds to DR 9-102. See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text. 
' Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A). See Cutler v. State Bar, 71 Cal. 2d 241, 455 
P.2d 108, 78 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1969); In re Stem, 92 N.J. 611, 458 A.2d 1279 (1983); In re 
Anschell, 53 A.D.2d 297, 385 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1976); Weston, supra note 3, at 49. 
6 See Heavey v. State Bar, 17 Cal. 3d 553, 551 P.2d 1238, 131 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1976); In re 
Castello, 402 N.E.2d 970 (Ind. 1980); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Stinson, 368 So. 2d 971 
(La. 1979); In re Witherington, 88 N.J. 241, 440 A.2d 1327 (1982); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. 
Tuttle, 41 Ohio St. 2d, 324 N.E.2d 753 (1975); In re Rollins, 281 S.C. 467, 316 S.E.2d 670 
(1984); In re Cary, 90 Wash. 2d. 762, 585 P.2d 1161 (1978). 
7 Black V. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 219, 225-26, 368 P.2d 118, 122, 18 Cal. Rptr. 518, 522 
(1962); see Florida Bar v. Boms, 428 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1983). 
8 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A)(2). Funds in which both the attomey and 
client have an interest are typically funds received by the attomey from which his fee will be 
paid. Examples of such funds are; judgment awards, e.g.. In re Rogers, 99 Ariz. 343, 409 P.2d 
45 (1965); settlement proceeds, e.g.. People v. Davis, 620 P.2d 725 (Colo. 1980); In re Hart-
man, 61 A.D.2d 194, 401 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1978); proceeds of a sale of a client's real or personal 
property, e.g., Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Burger, 401 P.2d 524 (Okla. 1965); State ex rel 
Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Dugger, 385 P.2d 486 (Okla. 1963); and estate proceeds, e.g., Attomey 
Grievance Comm'n v. Boehm, 293 Md. 476, 446 A.2d 52 (1982); In re Michaelson, 298 
N.W.2d 69 (Minn. 1980); In re Thomas, 294 Or. 505, 659 P.2d 960 (1983). 
9 State Bar of Tex., Op. 391 (1978), reprinted in 41 Tex. B.J. 322 (1978). 
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deposited to his general office account;'" but if they are the chent's 
property, in whole or in part, they must be deposited to the client 
trust account." 
How attorney fees fit into this dichotomy depends on their char­
acterization. When an attorney is employed to actually or potentially 
perform legal services, he has entered into a "retainer agreement."" 
Funds paid to the attorney at the outset, under the retainer agree­
ment, are also denominated as a "retainer." If the services being 
purchased are the attorney's availability to render a service if and as 
needed in a specified time frame, then the retainer is a "general re­
tainer;"" if the funds are for a specific service, then the employment 
relation as well as the fee is a "special retainer."" If the attorney 
contracts to receive his special retainer payment in advance of per­
forming the services, then that payment may be denominated as an 
"advance fee payment."" Advance fee payments present a difficult 
issue" since if they are not "funds of chents" within the meaning of 
DR 9-102, then depositing the funds in the client trust account vio­
lates DR 9-102(A), which mandates that funds belonging to the attor­
ney must not be deposited in the trustee account or otherwise 
1° A general office account contains those funds which are used either to pay expenses for 
operating the attorney's office or for the attorney's personal expenses. 
" Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102. 
12 See 1 S. Speiser, Attorneys' Fees § 1:1, at 3-4 (1973). 
12 A general retainer is a fee for agreeing to make legal services available when needed 
during a specified time period. In form, it is an option contract; the fee is earned by the 
attorney when paid since the attorney is entitled to the money regardless of whether he actu­
ally performs any services for the client. Baranowski v. State Bar, 24 Gal. 3d 153, 164 n.4, 593 
P.2d 613, 618 n.4, 154 Gal. Rptr. 752, 757 n.4 (1979); see Blair v. Columbian Fireproofing Co., 
191 Mass. 333, 77 N.E. 762 (1906). 
1^ See Jacobson v. Sassower, 113 Misc. 2d 279, 283, 452 N.Y.S.2d 981, 983-84 (N.Y. Civ. 
Q. 1982), aff'd, 122 Misc. 2d 863, 474 N.Y.S.2d 167 (N.Y. App. Term 1983), aff'd, 107 
A.D.2d 603, 483 N.Y.S.2d 711, aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 991, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381, 489 N.E.2d 1283 
(1985); 1 S. Speiser, supra note 12, § 1.4, at 7, § 1.8, at 11; 1 E. Thornton, A Treatise on 
Attorneys at Law § 133, at 228-30 (1914); G. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 505-06 & n.65; Mc-
Glain, The Strange Concept of the Legal Retaining Fee, 8 J. Legal Prof. 123 (1983). 
•2 An advance fee payment is a payment made by a client to the attorney prior to the 
performance of contemplated services. The attorney depletes the prepayment as he renders 
services. If the matter is completed or the attorney's work on the case otherwise ends, the 
attorney is obligated to refund the balance of the advance payment to the client. D.G. Bar, Op. 
113, at 1 (1982); Wash. State Bar Ass'n Code of Professional Responsibility Comm., Formal 
Op. 173, reprinted in Wash. State Bar News 50 (Oct. 1980); Model Code, supra note 4, DR 2-
110(AX3); Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.5 comment ("A lawyer may require advance 
payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion."). The advance fee payment 
must be distinguished from the general retainer. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying 
text. 
16 See Dimitriou, Should Prepaid Fees Be Put in a Trust Account?, 3 Calif. Law. 20, 21 
(1983) (Attorneys "cannot 'play it safe' by merely depositing prepaid fees in a client trust 
account."). 
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commingled with client funds except as provided by the rule.'' Simi­
larly, if the attorney deposits the prepaid fees in his office account, 
and advance fees are "funds of clients," the attorney can be disci­
plined for failing to account properly to the client for the money,'® as 
well as for commingling. 
Seventeen state and city bar associations and several courts (en­
compassing a substantial portion of the lawyers in the United States) 
have issued opinions on the subject." By an almost 2:1 margin, the 
opinions provide that advance fee payments must be deposited to the 
trust account.^" The most thorough exposition in the bar literature 
(and also the most recent) is the opinion of the New York State Bar 
Association Committee on Professional Ethics ("N.Y. 570"), which 
concludes that lawyers should deposit advance fee payments in their 
general office accounts rather than in client trust accounts, even when 
such payments are refundable to the extent not earned.^' This Article 
I'' See supra note 4. Consequently, an attorney cannot even prevent overdrawing of the 
trust account by keeping his funds in that account because he will be guilty of commingling. 
Kurzer, supra note 3, at 355 n.l; see also C. Wolfram, supra note 2, § 4.8, at 177 n.l (discuss­
ing when commingling occurs). 
Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(B). 
See infra notes 47-48. 
20 Characterizing the opinions is complicated by confusion as to the nature of the retainer 
being considered. All jurisdictions agree that a general retainer is earned when paid by the 
client and therefore that sum must be deposited to the lawyer's general account. A special 
retainer, paid in advance and denominated by the lawyer as nonrefundable, may be regarded as 
the functional equivalent of a general retainer. Arguably, however, nonrefundable special re­
tainers are illegal and unethical. See, e.g.. Professional Ethics Comm. of the Bar Ass'n of 
Greater Cleveland, Op. 84-1 (1984), digested in Law. Man. Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 
801:6952 (June 25, 1986); Comm. on Professional Ethics of the Bar Ass'n of Nassau County, 
Op. 85-5 (1985), digested in Law. Man. Prof. Conduct, supra, 801:6208 (May 28, 1986); Brick-
man & Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible Under Fiduciary, Statutory and 
Contract Law, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 149 (1988). But the issue is far from settled and a number 
of opinions countenance them. See, e.g.. 111. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, 
Op. 722 (1981), digested in Law. Man. Prof. Conduct, supra, 801:3007 (Dec. 24, 1984); Md. 
State Bar Ass'n, Op. 80-21 (undated), digested in Law. Man. Prof. Conduct, supra, 801:4301 
(July 23, 1986); Or. State Bar, Formal Op. 509 (1986). 
Opinions are categorized as majority if they hold either (1) that nonrefundable retainers 
are ethically valid and are therefore to be deposited to the general account since they are not 
"funds of clients," and also that advance fees not denominated as nonrefundable are to be 
deposited to a trust account; or (2) that nonrefundable retainers are unethical and all advance 
fee payments are to be deposited to a trust account. Opinions are categorized as minority 
regardless of their position on nonrefundable retainers if they hold that a refundable advance 
fee does not have to be deposited to a trust account. 
21 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 570 (1985) [hereinafter N.Y. 
570]. However, the committee also concluded "that DR 9-102(A) does not prohibit lawyers 
from agreeing with their clients to treat fee advances as client funds and depositing them in a 
client trust account." Id. at 6. The author was a member of the Committee during the time it 
deliberated on and adopted N.Y. 570. 
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critiques N.Y. 570 as a surrogate for the minority view," contending 
that it is wrong as a matter of ethics, fiduciary law, and policy. In­
deed, no conclusion in N.Y. 570 or any of the minority opinions is 
found acceptable or defensible. 
Section I of this Article examines the history of the prohibition 
against commingling. Section II discusses the modem-day rationale 
for DR 9-102. Section III assesses the minority view by critiquing 
N.Y. 570's analysis on textual, legal, and policy grounds; considers 
the federal tax consequences of the issue; and points out a serious 
omission in N.Y. 570 which renders it inconsistent with fiduciary law. 
Section IV compares the Model Rules of Professional Conduct's 
counterpart to DR 9-102. 
I. DR 9-102's ROOTS 
The obligation to segregate client funds arises from the principle 
that the attorney-client relationship is one of principal and agent.̂  ̂
As an agent, the attorney sustains any loss due to commingling of the 
client's property with the attorney's own property," or caused by fail­
ure to preserve the property's tmst character.̂ ' In the mid-nineteenth 
century David Hoffman, a leading American lecturer on law, pub­
lished his lectures,̂ ® including his highly influential Fifty Resolutions 
22 The majority of bar opinions on this issue are devoid of any reasoning, merely stating 
results. N.Y. 570 was chosen to critique because it was the most recent opinion to give the 
matter significant thought and analysis. An earlier opinion by the D.C. Bar, supra note 15, 
also provides analysis, and the arguments advanced therein which are not replicated in N.Y. 
570 are also critiqued as are arguments set forth in other bar opinions. 
23 See E. Weeks, A Treatise on Attorneys and Counselors at Law § 127, at 267-68 (2d ed. 
1982); Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct, supra note 20, 45:102 (July 24, 1985). 
24 See F. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Agency § 1280, at 931 (2d ed. 1982). 
25 Naltner v. Dolan, 108 Ind. 500, 8 N.E. 289 (1886). In this case, two attorneys deposite^ 
client funds in a separate bank account under their firm's name and not under their client s 
name. No other funds were deposited to that account. The bank failed and the client sought 
recovery from the attorney. The general rule was that a third party was not Uable for a loss of 
funds if the money was deposited to a separate account and its trust character preserved. Id. at 
503, 8 N.E. at 290. The court, in granting recovery to the client, held that the mere creation of 
a separate account for a client did not preserve the trust character of the funds. Because the 
attorneys, as trustees, could have claimed legal title to the funds (because it WM deposited in 
their names), the bank was required to pay the funds only to the attorneys. This would create 
a debtor/creditor relationship between the attorneys and the client which, in turn, would give 
the client a claim against the attorneys for the funds. The court concluded that for an attorney 
to avoid liability, he must deposit the money in a manner indicating that it is the client's 
money. Id. at 503-04, 8 N.E. at 291. 
26 David Hoffman authored two major legal works: Legal Outlines (R.H. Helmholz & D. 
Bernard, Jr. eds. 1981) (1836) and A Course of Legal Study, Addressed to Students and the 
Profession Generally (1972) (1836). Mr. Hoffman " 'has contributed to elevate [the profes­
sion's] standard of learning and morals, to encourage the young aspirant for its honourable 
rewards, and, as a consequence, to extend its just influence in the community.' " D. Hoffman, 
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regarding professional conduct.^"' One Resolution reflected and repli­
cated the agency principle: "I will on no occasion blend with my own 
my client's money. If kept distinctly as his, it will be less liable to be 
considered as my own."^^ Hoffman's Resolutions eventually formed 
the basis of the first formal code of ethics, adopted by the Alabama 
Bar Association in 1887,^' which, in turn, served as a model for the 
predecessor of the Code, the Canons of Ethics, adopted by the Ameri­
can Bar Association in 1908.^° The Hoffman admonition regarding 
client money became section 37 of the Alabama Code of Ethics^^ and, 
in turn, became Canon IP^ of the Canons of Ethics, which was 
amended in 1933^^ and in 1937.^^ DR 9-102 now embodies the prohi­
bition against commingling. 
II. CONTEMPORARY POLICY 
Preserving the identity of client funds originally served two pur-
Hints on the Professional Deportment of Lawyers, with Some Counsel to Law Students 63 
(Philadelphia 1846) (quoting an excerpt from The American Jurist). 
27 J. Ram, A Treatise on Facts as Subjects of Inquiry by a Jury 386-99 (3d ed. 1982). 
28 Id. at 392 (emphasis in original). 
29 Alabama Code of Ethics (1887). See J. Devine, Problems and Materials on Lawyer 
Trust Accounting 9 n.2 (1984). 
20 See J. Devine, supra note 29, at 9-10. 
21 Section 37 provided: "Money or other trust property coming into the possession of the 
attorney should be promptly reported, and never commingled with his private property or 
used by him, except with the client's knowledge and consent." Alabama Code of Ethics § 37 
(1887), reprinted in J. Devine, supra note 29, at 10. 
22 Canon 11 provided: "Money of the client or other trust property coming into the posses­
sion of the lawyer should be reported promptly, and except with the client's knowledge and 
consent should not be commingled with his private property or be used by him." Canons of 
Ethics (ABA 1908), reprinted in J. Devine, supra note 29, at 10-11. 
22 The "consent exception" in the 1908 version of Canon 11, see supra note 32, produced 
results inconsistent with the purposes of Canon 11: "Before a lawyer would deposit money, the 
lawyer would obtain the consent of the client so to do, thus relieving the lawyer of personal 
responsibility. Even if consent from the client was procured through less than honorable 
means, it was easier to escape liability where the bank failed." J. Devine, supra note 29, at 21 
n.2. Consequently, Canon 11 was redrafted. The amendment provided in part: "Money of the 
client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the 
lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circum­
stances be commingled with his own or be used by him." Id. at 22. 
2^ Canon 11, as amended in 1937, stated: 
The Lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or 
gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. 
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming 
into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, 
and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used 
by him. 
Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 11 (ABA 1937). 
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poses: to shield client funds from the attorney's creditors,̂ ' and to 
protect the attorney from liability should these funds be lost, for ex­
ample, by bank failure.̂ ® These original underpinnings for DR 9-102 
have become relatively less important as more contemporary policies 
have emerged: to protect the client's money from the attorney and the 
attorney from temptation. As stated in State v. Statmore,̂  ̂the prohi­
bition against commingling embodied in DR 9-102 now serves the 
additional purpose of: 
" 'provid[ing] against the probability in some cases, the possibihty 
in many cases, and the danger in all cases that such commingling 
will result in the loss of clients' money. Moral turpitude is not 
necessarily involved in the commingling of a client's money with 
an attorney's own money if the client's money is not endangered by 
such procedure and is always available to him. However, inher­
ently there is danger in such practice for frequently unforeseen cir­
cumstances arise jeopardizing the safety of the chent's funds, and 
as far as the chent is concerned the result is the same whether his 
money is deliberately misappropriated by an attorney or is uninten­
tionally lost by circumstances beyond the control of the 
attorney.' 
Both the historical and contemporary policies are concerned 
with loss of client funds: the former with loss to the attorney's credi­
tors and the latter with loss by defalcation. Attorneys who commin­
gle their own funds with those of their clients may confidently assume 
that the funds they are removing from the security account are their 
own when, in fact, due to inadvertence or miscalculation, they may be 
a client's funds. "At some point mere negligence [becomes] blatant 
embezzlement." '̂ For example, if the attorney expects a large fee 
from settlement of a major personal injury action to arrive momen­
tarily but lacks the cash in his office account to pay his employees, he 
may borrow from his clients' account to cover his present demands— 
fully intending of course to replace the money after he receives that 
large fee. Indeed, he does do so. But the situation recurs, except the 
fee does not materialize due to unforeseen circumstances. The attor­
ney then borrows more money from a second client to repay the first 
35 See In re Clayter, 78 111. 2d 276, 281, 399 N.E.2d 1318, 1320 (1980); Trustees v. Beck-
mann, 143 N.J. Super. 548, 364 A.2d 15 (1976). 
36 See supra note 25. 
37 218 Neb. 138, 352 N.W.2d 875 (1984). 
38 Statmore, 218 Neb. at 142, 352 N.W.2d at 878 (quoting In re Moore, 110 Ariz. 312, 314-
15, 518 P.2d 562, 564-65 (1974) (quoting Peck v. State Bar, 217 Cal. 47, 17 P.2d 112 (1932))). 
39 Carpenter, The Negligent Attorney Embezzler: Delaware's Solution, 61 A.B.A. J. 338, 
338 (1975). See Comment, Attorney Misappropriation of Clients' Funds: A Study in Profes­
sional Responsibility, 10 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 415, 416 (1977). 
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client and the pattern continues.'*" At both junctures he has commin­
gled funds; if client demands for repayment cannot be met, then his 
innocent commingling has turned into embezzlement. 
By maintaining separate, clearly identifiable accounts that re­
quire accurate record keeping and reporting, the temptation to use 
client funds for personal use lessens,̂ * as does the potential for harm 
to the client.'*  ̂ Failure to follow the requirements of DR 9-102 war­
rants disciplinary action even if the client suflFers no harm."*  ̂ Because 
even the appearance of impropriety undermines public confidence in 
the legal profession,'*'* it is important to deter even relatively innocent 
commingling'*  ̂by careful maintenance of client security accounts.'*® 
III. CRITIQUE OF N.Y. 570 AND THE MINORITY POSITION 
According to one court and the majority of state and city bar 
committees that have commented on the subject, advance payments 
of legal fees must be deposited to client trust accounts.'*' A minority 
40 See Comment, Attorney Misappropriation of Client Funds (pt. 2), 27 How. L.J. 1597, 
1604-06 (1984) (describing case of attorney who became involved in " 'a process of robbing 
Peter to pay Paul that he hoped would end when he could catch up with a big negligence 
settlement or an investment killing' "). 
"[L]ead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil . . . ." Matthew 6:13. 
'••2 See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Hinrichs, 486 So. 2d 116 (La. 1986) (attorney unable to 
remit settlement money to client because he used the money to pay personal debts). 
Even if the client suffers no harm from the attorney's commingling, the commingling 
still violates DR 9-102 and is treated accordingly, although punishment may be ameliorated. 
See Florida Bar v. Whitlock, 426 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1982); In re Penegor, 104 Wis. 2d 133, 310 
N.W.2d 796 (1981); see also C. Wolfram, supra note 2, § 4.8, at 177 ("[I]t should normally be 
irrelevant that a client suffered no direct loss because of a lawyer's personal use of a trust 
account."). 
44 See Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. White, 
209 N.W.2d 11 (Iowa 1973); In re Windsor, 373 P.2d 612 (Or. 1962); Comment, supra note 
40, at 1598 n.5. 
45 Model Code, supra note 4, EC 9-5; see Comment, supra note 39, at 416 n.6. 
46 Some states authorize annual audits of client security accounts to deter commingling. 
See, e.g., Austem, supra note 3, at 16 (thirteen states require audits of client trust accounts); 
Comment, supra note 40, at 1601 (discussing Delaware's spot-check investigations). See gen­
erally Carpenter, supra note 39, at 339-41 (development of Delaware's policing mechanisms); 
Sherman, More Random Audits: Big Brother Might be Watching, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 15, 1988, at 
1, col. 3 (nationwide audit practices). A more effective device is for the annual audits to take 
place without advance notice (as is the case in the securities and accounting industries). See C. 
Wolfram, supra note 2, § 4.8, at 182-83. Five states now impose random audits of lawyers' 
security accounts. McMahon, Report to State Bar on Attorneys' Escrow Accounts, Panel 
Says Random Auditing Would Not Curb Embezzlement, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 28, 1988, at 1, col. 3, 
at 3, col. 1. Both the First and Second Judicial Departments of the Appellate Division of the 
State of New York have adopted a random audit proposal. Wise, Escrow Audits Delayed in 
First Department, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1988, at 1, col. 3. Disciplinary counsel in New York 
have expressed support for random audits because of their deterrent effects. Fox, Mixed Reac­
tions by Lawyers to Audit Escrow Accounts, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 9, 1988, at 1, col. 3, at 2, col. 4. 
4' See Ind. State Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Subcomm., Formal Op. 4 (1977) (no analysis); 
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declares that advance fee payments may or must be deposited to the 
attorney's general office account, even if the funds are refundable if 
unearned."*® Since N.Y. 570 is the most thorough exposition of the 
minority view, it will be used as a surrogate for that view '̂ in the 
following critique. 
N.Y. 570 expounds that advance fee payments need not be con­
sidered as "funds of clients" and therefore need not be deposited to a 
client trust account.®" The arguments the opinion poses supporting 
News Bull, of Iowa State Bar Ass'n Client Security & Attorney Disciplinary Comm'n (1988) 
(no analysis); Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 78-11 (1978) (no ansJysis); 
Or. State Bar, Op. 454 (1980) (no analysis; advance fees are to be deposited to trust account 
but not nonrefundable fees); Or. State Bar, Op. 509 (1986) (same); Bar Ass'n of San Francisco 
Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1980-1 (1980) (analysis refers to Baranowski v. State Bar, 24 Cal. 3d 
153, 164 n.4, 593 P.2d 613, 618 n.4, 154 Cal. Rptr. 752, 757 n.4 (1979); the opinion states that 
general retainers are to be deposited to the firm's general account); Ethics Advisory Comm. of 
the S.C. Bar, Op. 81-15 (1982) (no analysis; general retainers are to be deposited to the general 
account; special retainers to the trust account); State Bar of Tex., supra note 9 (analysis by 
specific fact situations; if for services not yet rendered, must be deposited to the trust account); 
Va. State Bar, Formal Op. 186-A (1981) (no analysis); Va. State Bar, Op. 681 (1985) (same); 
Wash. State Bar Ass'n, supra note 15 (some analysis); State Bar of Wis., Formal Op. E-86-9 
(1986) (no analysis; gener^ retainers are to be deposited to the lawyer's general account, but 
advance fees are to be deposited to the trust account); In re Aronson, 352 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 
1984) (no analysis); see also D.C. Bar, supra note 15 (dissent) (favoring the trust account 
position after analyzing the D.C. bar's decision and legislative history). While the relevant 
Pennsylvania bar committee has not commented on the subject, the U.S. Tax Court has held 
that under the Pennsylvania Code of Professional Responsibility, all advance fee payments had 
to be deposited to a client trust account. Miele v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 284 (1979). See 
generally Shank, Are Advance Fee Payments Clients' Funds?, 55 Cal. St. B.J. 370, 370-71 
(1980) ("Case law, ethics opinions and public policy demonstrate that advance fee payments 
should be treated as funds held for the client's benefit . . . ."); Law. Man., supra note 20, at 
45:103-04 ("The majority of bar associations that have considered [whether fee advances are 
the property of a client subject to trust account requirements] have found that the money 
belongs to the client and may not be placed in the lawyer's personal account."). 
48 See D.C. Bar, supra note 15 (analysis); Fla. Bar, Ethics Comm., Op. 76-27 (1976) (no 
analysis); Disciplinary Board of the Haw. Supreme Court, Formal Op. 29 (1985) (general re­
tainers and "premiums" paid to an attorney in recognition of his "experience, reputation and 
ability" and so designated by written agreement are nonrefundable and therefore may be de­
posited to the lawyer's general account; in the absence of such explicit agreement, the funds are 
to be deposited to the trust account); 111. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 703 (1980) (no analysis); Md. 
State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 83-62 (1983) (no analysis); N.Y. 570, supra note 21 
(extensive analysis); Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 86-128 (1986) 
(no analysis); see also Dimitriou, supra note 16 (advocating the minority position); cf. C. Wolf­
ram, supra note 2, § 4.8, at 178 n.l5 ("Even if the lawyer is entitled to treat the fee payment as 
his or her own once it is received ... if the lawyer is later required to repay the fee and fails to 
do so, one decision has held that the lawyer violates DR 9-102(B)(4)." (citing Office of Disci­
plinary Counsel v. Kagawa, 63 Haw. 150, 157, 622 P.2d 115, 120 (1981))). 
49 See supra note 22. 
5° N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 4. The District of Columbia Bar ("D.C.") agrees with the 
New York Bar Association that advance fee payments are not "funds of clients," although for 
different reasons. D.C. concludes that: 
Generally, "funds of client[s]" are monies received by an attorney from a third 
party for the benefit of a client or from a client for the benefit of a third party other 
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its position are of three varieties: textual, legal, and policy. 
A. Textual 
The Code sections Avhich are the subject of the textual scrutiny 
are DR 2-110(A)(2) and (A)(3) and DR 9-102. These sections "cod­
ify" the fiduciary nature of the lawyer-client relationship by stating 
protections for client property in the lawyer's possession. The range 
of the protections listed is extensive, and, by distinguishing among the 
various forms which client property can take, the Code specializes the 
protections to the type of property. 
The grand design of the protections enumerated can be best 
gleaned if the protections are listed in the chronological order in 
which they come to apply to client property. The birth of fiduciary 
concern occurs when the attorney comes into possession of client 
property in any of its various forms; for example, securities or funds. 
At that point, if it did not come directly from the client he is to notify 
the client of its receipt.'' The attorney must also initiate careful rec­
ord keeping procedures for all client property in his possession re­
gardless of whether it came to him directly from the client or was paid 
or delivered by a third party, and is to render an accounting to the 
client whenever appropriate.'^ If the property is in the form of securi­
ties or other valuable items, it is to be safeguarded by placement in a 
safe deposit box (or other safe place) as quickly as possible." If the 
property is in the form of "funds of clients paid to a lawyer'"'' includ­
ing "[fjunds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or 
potentially to the lawyer,"" it is to be safeguarded by segregating it 
from the lawyer's personal funds and depositing it to a client security 
than the attorney. Some portion of these funds may undoubtedly be used to satisfy 
the lawyer's fee. Typically, these funds are properties of the client received from 
the sale of assets or settlement of a claim or estate and held temporarily by the 
attorney where the temptation for the attorney to use or confuse the client's assets 
with his own must be avoided. Hence, the detailed requirements for segregating 
and safeguarding these properties. 
D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 4-5. Although advance fee payments are received directly from the 
client rather than a third party, the temptation to commingle or misappropriate the funds is 
still very strong. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. Because D.C. opines that this 
kind of temptation necessitates the Code's strict accounting and record keeping requirements 
for monies received from third parties, these requirements should also apply to advance fee 
payments. See D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 7 (dissent) ("If the Code prohibits commingling of 
traditional trust funds in order to avoid these dangers, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
Code also prohibits commingling of advances in order to avoid an identical danger."). 
'1 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(B)(1). 
52 Id. DR 9-102(B)(3). 
53 Id. DR 9-102(B)(2). 
54 Id. DR 9-102(A). 
55 Id. DR 9-102(A)(2). 
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account.'® 
If the lawyer seeks to withdraw from representation—whether at 
his initiation or that of the client—he must first return all client prop­
erty in his possession, including not only the various forms of prop­
erty already mentioned but also "papers" which, though they may not 
have intrinsic value, are necessary if the client is to pursue or defend 
his claim with another lawyer.'^ After withdrawal, and without the 
need for a client request, the lawyer is to refund promptly any 
unearned advance fee payments.'® When the advance fee was initially 
paid, it was in the form of "funds of clients paid to a lawyer" (and 
therefore to have been deposited into a security account).'® Assuming 
that as of the time of withdrawal some or ail of the work contem­
plated has been completed, then the advance fee exists as "[f]unds 
belonging in part to a client and in part... to the lawyer" (to which 
the depository requirement extends though the lawyer can withdraw 
undisputed amounts due him).®° Finally, all client property in the 
lawyer's possession is to be promptly paid or delivered to the client on 
request, providing that the client is entitled to the property.®' 
N.Y. 570 presents four textual arguments to advance the idea 
that "funds of clients" do not include advance fee payments:®^ (1) cli-
5® Id. DR 9-102(A). See also notes 35-46 and accompanying text (policy against 
commingling). 
" Model Code, supra note 4, DR 2-110(A)(2). 
'8 Id. DR 2-110(A)(3); Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.5 comment. 
'9 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A). This statement is the proposition that the 
Article sets out to prove. It is stated in conclusory form here because I am describing the 
"grand design" of the Code's protections for client property. 
60 Id. DR 9-102(A)(2). 
61 Id. DR 9-102(B)(4). 
62 N.Y. 570 states the textual arguments as follows: 
Textually, it appears that the drafters of the Code of Professional Responsibility 
did not consider advance payments of fees to be client funds necessitating their 
deposit in a trust accotmt. DR 9-102(A) makes no explicit reference to advance 
fee payments. The Code does make explicit reference to advance fee payments in 
DR 2-110(A)(3), which requires that any unearned fee advance be promptly re­
funded upon termination of the representation; it does not require that the advance 
be deposited in a trust account until earned. Indeed, DR 2-110 treats fee advances 
and client property as different things. It provides specifically in DR 2-110(A)(2) 
for the return of all client property to the client upon withdrawal from employ­
ment, and then provides separately for the refund of any unearned fee advance in 
DR 2-110(A)(3). 
Nor is there any suggestion in any of the Code's numerous provisions dealing 
with legal fees or client funds that advance pajmients of legal fees are deemed 
client funds to be deposited in a trust account. 
N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 4. 
The sequence in which the four textual arguments appear in N.Y. 570 is 3, 1, 2, 4. The 
third argument of N.Y. 570 is listed and discussed first because it benefits the flow of the 
discussion. 
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ent property and advance fee payments are different things, that is, 
advance fee payments are not a subset of client property, and since 
funds of clients are a subset of client property, then advance fee pay­
ments cannot therefore be included in funds of clients;" (2) there is 
no indication in the text in which funds of clients appears (DR 9-
102(A)) that funds of clients include advance fee payments; therefore, 
funds of clients do not include advance fee payments; (3) there is no 
indication in the text in which advance fee payments appears (DR 2-
110(A)(3)) that they are included in funds of clients; therefore, funds 
of clients do not include advance fee payments; (4) in the rest of the 
Code, there is no indication that funds of clients include advance fee 
payments; therefore funds of clients do not include advance fee 
payments. 
1. Client Property and Advance Fee Payments 
Are Different Things 
The textual argument advanced by N.Y. 570 to be discussed first 
is that "DR 2-110 treats fee advances and client property as diflFerent 
things."" DR 2-110(A)(2) provides for the return of client property 
before withdrawal,®' and DR 2-110(A)(3) provides for the return of 
advance fees upon withdrawal.®® Because these Code sections treat 
fee advances and client property as different things, the authors of 
N.Y. 570 argue that advance fees are not a part of client property. 
Further, since funds of clients are included in client property, then fee 
advances cannot be included in funds of clients.®' 
Both the premise and the logic of this argument are wrong. By 
addressing advance fee payments and other client property in different 
subsections, the drafters of the Code have not evinced an intent to 
declare them "different things." There are several reasons why ad­
vance fee payments are singled out for specific attention—none of 
which reflect an intent to classify advance fee payments to the extent 
unearned as other than client property. Indeed the intent is to the 
63 The argument that appears in N.Y. 570 is that client property and advance fee payments 
are treated "as different things" in DR 2-110. The conclusion that therefore advance fee pay­
ments cannot be included in funds of clients is not expressly stated but can be inferred. In­
deed, not inferring the conclusion in the form stated could lead to a nonsequitur, i.e., since 
advance fee payments are, according to N.Y. 570, different from client property, then they are 
not "funds of clients." 
64 N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 4. 
65 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 2-110(A)(2). 
66 Id. DR 2-110(A)(3). 
67 Although N.Y. 570 does not explicitly conclude that because fee advances are not client 
property, therefore they are not "funds of clients," that is the inference (indeed the only infer­
ence) that logically flows from the N.Y. 570 analysis. 
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contrary. DR 2-110 sets forth conditions for withdrawal from em­
ployment,®® including the steps a withdrawing lawyer must take "to 
avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his chent."®® Before the 
lawyer withdraws, he must return the client's property, especially the 
papers which the client will need if he is to continue representation 
with another lawyer. As for advance fee payments, any unearned por­
tion need not be refunded in advance since, as a practical matter, the 
amount to be refunded can only be calculated after withdrawal. In­
deed, the act of withdrawal, which may include petitioning a tribunal 
for permission to withdraw™ or meeting with the client's replacement 
lawyer to bring him up to speed, may itself result in billable hours; the 
necessary accounting, therefore, can only take place subsequent to 
withdrawal. Therefore, repayment of unearned advance fees could 
not have been addressed in DR 2-110(A)(2) because of the temporal 
diflfierences. From this perspective, DR 2-110(A)(3) is improperly 
paragraphed; it should have appeared as a subset of DR 2-
110(A)(2)—as DR 2-110(A)(2)(a) rather than as DR 2-110(A)(3). 
Advance fee payments are also singled out for attention because 
of the need to articulate the substantive position that advance fee pay­
ments are not the lawyer's money until earned.'* This is made a part 
of the "withdrawal" provisions of the Code because it is in the context 
of withdrawal that the issue of refundability is most germane. DR 2-
110(A)(2) commands the return of all property "to which the client is 
entitled"; DR 2-110(A)(3) defines that entitlement to include advance 
fee payments to the extent unearned—^again demonstrating that DR 
2-110(A)(3) is a subset of DR 2-110(A)(2). The substantive statement 
is a part of a broader common law rule recognized by a majority of 
states that discharged attorneys—who must withdraw if they are dis­
charged with or without cause'^—^may recover only the reasonable 
value of the services they have rendered and are not entitled to con­
tract damages.'® 
68 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 2-110. 
69 Id. DR 2-110(A)(2). 
70 Id. DR 2-110(A)(1). 
71 Consider the situation where a client turns over money to an attorney to be used to buy 
a house. Clearly, that money is the client's, see Peterson, Trust Accounts and Client Property, 
49 Tex. B.J. 366, 366 (1986), and is included in DR 2-110(A)(2) as property that must be 
returned prior to the attorney's withdrawal. Since both the real estate deposit and the 
unearned advance fee payments are client's money, what does DR 2 110(A)(3) add to DR 2-
110(A)(2)? DR 2-110(AX3) clarifies that advance fee payments are not the attorney's money 
until earned. 
72 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 2-110(B)(4). 
73 See Note, For a Few Dollars More: Client's Right to Discharge His Attorney Under a 
Contingent Fee Contract, 7 Cardozo L. Rev. 913, 919 n.40 (1986) (citing cases from 34 states). 
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As demonstrated, expressly dealing with advance fee payments 
to the extent unearned in one subsection of the Code is not a basis for 
concluding that they are not a form of client property. Indeed, it is 
the specialized treatment accorded the advance fee payment that spe­
cifically categorizes it as a form of client property. 
EverTaccepting N.Y. 570's faulty premise—since advance fee 
payments and client property are different things, then advance fee 
payments are not a part of client property—the conclusion derived— 
since funds of clients is included in client property, then advance fee 
payments cannot be included in funds of clients—is illogical. As illus­
trated below, both advance fee payments and funds of clients can be 
wholly included in client property even if they are regarded as mutu­
ally exclusive. By the same token, however, it does not logically fol­
low that because unearned advance fee payments are a form of client 
property, that therefore they are "funds of clients." That is, though 
funds of clients and advance fee payments are both included in client 
property, it does not follow that advance fee payments are included in 
funds of clients (or that funds of clients is included in advance fee 
payments). That must be separately established as a matter of statu­
tory construction (and will be established following the discussion of 
N.Y. 570's second and third arguments). 
2. DR 9-102(A) Does Not Indicate that "Funds of Clients" 
Include Advance Fee Payments 
Since the strategy for any textual argument is dictated by what 
the text says (and does not say), and since there is no Code text stat­
ing that advance fee payments are not included in "funds of clients," 
then a less persuasive but next best alternative is to argue, as does 
N.Y. 570 in the second of its four arguments, that DR 9-102(A)'s 
depository requirements which are applied to "funds of clients" does 
not apply to advance fee payments because if the drafters of die Code 
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had so intended, they would have so stated.'" That is, since the Code 
does not specifically define "funds of clients" to include advance fee 
payments, then advance fee payments are not funds of clients." But 
it is just as persuasive to argue, as a matter of logic, that because the 
drafters of the Code did not say elsewhere that "funds of clients" do 
not include funds which are in the form of advance fee payments, and 
since the term "funds of clients" can easily be interpreted to include 
advance fee payments (as a majority of opining bar associations have 
so found'^), then if the intent was not to include advance fee pay­
ments, the drafters would have so stated. Therefore, "funds of cli­
ents" do include advance fee payments. Logically, then, both the 
N.Y. 570 argument and its converse fail. 
This is not to say, however, that textual arguments regarding 
whether "funds of clients" include advance fee payments are not 
available. While the omission of an inclusion does not in and of itself 
yield meaning, other textual material can provide persuasive argu­
ment. Note that DR 9-102(A) provides that all "funds of clients" are 
to be deposited to a security account except funds which are "ad­
vances for costs and expenses."" By stipulating that certain specific 
"advances" need not be deposited to a security account, and by recog­
nizing the existence of a "fee paid in advance" in DR 2-110(A)(3) but 
not including that advance in the advances listed as exceptions in DR 
9-102(A), the drafters could be indicating that advance fees had to be 
deposited to a security account. For the position taken by N.Y. 570 
to be persuasive, the drafters would have to have said that "funds of 
clients" except "advances for costs ... expenses [and fees]" were to be 
deposited to a security account. If omission of the exception for fees 
in the listing of exceptions to the depositing requirement is pur­
poseful, then the position taken by N.Y. 570 is against the drafter's 
meaning. 
3. DR 2-110(A)(3) Does Not Indicate that Client Funds Include 
Advance Fee Payments 
The third textual argument is the mirror image of the second: 
Cf. D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 5-6 (same argument applied to D.C. Code of Professional 
Responsibility). 
•'s This is a parody of the ejusdem generis rule of construction, where specific words follow­
ing general words are interpreted to limit the meaning of the general words. Black's Law 
Dictionary 464 (5th ed. 1979). In this case, the argument is that general words which are not 
followed by specific words are limited by the absence of the specific words. 
See supra note 47. But see N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 4, which argues that "it strains 
the normal meaning of words to interpret the phrase 'funds of clients' as embracing advance 
legal fees paid to the lawyer." 
Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A). 
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namely, that advance fee payments are not included in funds of clients 
because the text in which advance fee payments appear does not say 
they are included in funds of clients. Thus, N.Y. 570 argues that 
since DR2-110(A)(3) commands only that a lawyer promptly refund 
an unearned advance fee after withdrawal, and does not state where 
the lawyer must keep these funds prior to withdrawal, they need not 
be kept in a security account.'® That argument is tautological, how­
ever, in that its validity depends upon assuming the conclusion that it 
seeks to draw; namely, that DR 9-102(A)'s "funds of clients" do not 
include advance fee payments. If one concluded that "funds of cli­
ents" include advance fee payments, then of course the reason why 
DR 2-110(A)(3) does not expressly provide for the deposit of advance 
fees into a security account is because that it is provided for in DR 9-
102(A). 
Contrary to the position of N.Y. 570, there is considerable tex­
tual evidence—supplemented by legal and policy considerations"— 
that advance fee payments to the extent unearned are "funds of cli­
ents," and that the "grand design" set forth at the beginning of this 
section is the one most consistent with the interaction of the various 
provisions of DR 2-110 and DR 9-102. 
Both DR 9-102(B)(3) and DR 9-102(A) deal with client funds; in 
the former, the phraseology is "funds ... of a cUent," and in the 
latter, "funds of clients." The terms must be taken as identical in 
meaning. Therefore, if advance fee payments are not "funds of cli­
ents" for purposes of DR 9-102(A), then they are not "funds ... of a 
client" for purposes of DR 9-102(B)(3), which provides that a lawyer 
shall maintain "complete records" and "render appropriate accounts" 
of client funds in "the possession of the lawyer."®" If N.Y. 570's con­
clusions were controlling, then a lawyer receiving an advance fee pay­
ment who is discharged prior to completion of the work for which he 
was hired, and who therefore is obligated to return the unearned por­
tion of the advance fee, would not be obligated to have kept records of 
the funds or to render an accounting to the client.®^ 
DR 9-102(B)(4) provides for the prompt return to the client, on 
his request, of all "funds, securities, or other properties in the posses­
sion of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive,"®' Again, the 
•'s N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 4. 
See infra notes 101-27 and accompanying text. 
80 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(B)(3). 
81 Cf. Va. State Bar, supra note 47 Oawyer who receives an advance fee and whose client 
discharges him before the services are fully performed must account to the client, upon re­
quest, for all or any part of the fee paid and services performed). 
82 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(B)(4). 
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"funds" of DR 9-102(B)(4) are the "funds" of DR 9-102(A). Assume 
that very shortly after payment of a fee advanced for the performance 
of a specific service, a client has a change of heart and decides not to 
proceed with that legal matter. The lawyer, to that point, has ex­
pended no time. Under the leading case of Martin v. Camp,^^ the 
lawyer is obligated to return the entire advance fee. Since the lawyer 
has not withdrawn (because the client is still contemplating going for­
ward), he is not obligated by DR 2-110(A)(3) to return the advance 
fee. Nor would DR 9-102 provide the basis for the lawyer's obligation 
to refund the funds, as requested, if, as N.Y. 570 stated, "funds of 
clients" did not include advance fee payments. Indeed, once DR 9-
102 is read as N.Y. 570 reads it, there is no basis in the Code (or 
Model Rules) to conclude that the lawyer is obligated to promptly 
return the fee upon request. The N.Y. 570 interpretation of DR 9-
102(B)(4) is therefore inconsistent with the all-inclusive compass of 
that section regarding the prompt payment of all client funds in the 
lawyer's possession which the client is entitled to receive. 
DR 9-102(A)(2) states that "[f]unds belonging in part to a client 
and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer . . . must be depos­
ited" to a trust account.®"* Two situations are envisioned by that re­
quirement: (1) where payment is received in a contingent fee case 
from which a percentage is to be paid to the lawyer; and (2) the ad­
vance fee payment. When the fee payment is advanced to the lawyer, 
he has not yet earned that money; the money is only potentially his.®' 
DR 9-102(A)(2) further provides that the portion of the jointly owned 
funds belonging to the lawyer may be withdrawn "when due" (unless 
the client disputes the payment),®® again specifically contemplating 
the advance fee payment situation (as well as the contingent fee). As 
the lawyer performs the requested service, he can withdraw that part 
of the advance fee that he has earned from the trust fund.®^ N.Y. 570 
advances no credible argument why such jointly owned funds should 
not be interpreted according to their plain meaning®® to include ad-
83 219 N.Y. 170, 176, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916). 
84 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A)(2). 
85 "By speaking of funds which 'potentially' belong to the lawyer, this provision appears to 
anticipate the [advance fee situation] At the time the advance is tendered by the client, the 
lawyer has not yet earned it, and the money is only potentially his...." D.C. Bar, supra note 
15, at 6 (dissent). See Shank, supra note 47, at 371; see also State Bar of Tex., supra note 9, at 
12 (if "no guarantee that the attorney will be entitled to the full amount," the funds must be 
deposited into a trust account). 
86 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A)(2). 
87 See Miele v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 284, 286 (1979) (earned fees withdrawn quarterly 
for convenience). 
88 Those inclined to pick at nits could take issue with the "plain meaning" argument. An 
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vance fee payments.®' 
N.Y. 570's argument that "funds of clients" do not include ad­
vance fee payments because the Code does not specifically provide 
either in DR 2-110(A)(3) or DR 9-102(A) that they do has already 
been dealt with as a matter of logic.®® From the perspective of mesh­
ing the two Code sections in the manner most consistent with the 
stated purposes and objectives, we can see obvious reasons why DR 2-
110(A)(3) does not expressly state that advance fee payments are to be 
deposited to a trust account. The Code's drafters did not spell out the 
entire panoply of protections accorded client property in DR 2-110 
because property was being considered only in the context of with­
drawal from representation. Providing in DR 2-110 that advance fee 
payments were to be deposited to a security account not only would 
be irrelevant to DR 2-110's purpose, but would also be redundant 
since DR 9-102, as per its title, "Preserving Identity of Funds and 
Property of a Client," provides protections regardless of whether the 
lawyer's representation is ongoing or terminating. DR 2-110(A) also 
does not require the withdrawing lawyer to provide the client with an 
accounting of his property or advance fee payment though that is ger­
mane to withdrawal, since that is provided for in all circumstances in 
DR 9-102(B)(3). Similarly, it does not provide for deposit of property 
(to the extent that funds are involved) or advance fee payments into a 
security account because that is provided for in all circumstances in 
DR 9-102(A). 
The schematic design of DR 9-102 further supports the thesis of 
this paper. Client property must be safeguarded—that is the fiduciary 
ukase. But how? "Funds of chents" are to be deposited into a secur­
ity account to protect them from the lawyer's creditors," from the 
advance fee paid to a lawyer, which both he and the client anticipate the lawyer will earn in 
toto, could be said to be not "[f]unds belonging in part of a client and in part presently or 
potentiaUy to the lawyer," Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A)(2), but rather, fluids 
potentially belonging in whole to the lawyer. The same situation occurs when a lawyer on a 
one-third contingent fee receives a settlement check in a personal injury case made out jointly 
to his client and himself, which he deposits to the trust account, and then pays out two-thirds 
to the client but does not withdraw his one-third because the client disputes the contingent fee; 
the funds remaining are potentially entirely the lawyer's. To state precisely what the drafters 
meant, DR 9-102(AX2) should be read as if it said "[f]unds belonging in part [or in whole, 
presently or potentially] to a client and in part [or in whole] presently or potentially to the 
lawyer . . . must be deposited" to the security account. The solution to this nit does not 
diminish the textual argument regarding DR 9-102(AX2). 
8' It is secondarily applicable to the contingent fee case where the client objects to the fee 
percentage. That objection suspends the lawyer's right to withdraw the part that represents his 
fee until the dispute is resolved. Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(AX2). 
^ See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
" See supra note 35. 
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lawyer,'^ and from the lawyer's self-help remedy if those funds in­
clude or constitute the lawyer's fee. DR 9-102(A)'s depository re­
quirements do not deal with the broader category of client property, 
because items which are client property but not "funds of chents," 
such as client papers, deeds, and securities, are physically incapable of 
being deposited into a security account. They can and must be safe­
guarded by deposit into a safe deposit box,'^ which is the closest 
equivalent of deposit to a security account. As already noted, the no­
tification, record keeping, accounting, and payment requirements ap­
ply to all client property in the lawyer's possession. "Funds of 
chents" and other client property require different treatment with re­
gard to their safeguarding—the former in security accounts, and the 
latter in a safe deposit box—^but are treated alike, since funds are a 
subset of property, regarding notification, record keeping, accounting, 
and repayment. Accordingly, the "failure" to include in DR 9-
102(A) that "funds of clients" include advance fee payments or to 
include in DR 2-110(A)(3) that advance fee payments are "funds of 
clients" are not failures at all, but simply reflect a drafting design 
which both from the point of view of specific Code provisions and the 
broader fiduciary purposes of the Code, is most consistent with the 
position that "funds of clients" include advance fee payments. 
4. Code Gives No Indication that Client Funds Include Advance 
Fee Payments 
The fourth textual argument raised by N.Y. 570 is that there is 
no "suggestion in any of the Code's numerous provisions dealing with 
legal fees or client funds that advance fee payments are to be depos­
ited in a trust account.'"'* However, eight of the nine Disciplinary 
Rules and thirteen of the fourteen Ethical Considerations cited'' are 
totally irrelevant'® to the question of whether advance fee payments 
are "funds of clients." For example, DR 2-106 sets forth the criteria 
for determining whether a fee is excessive," DR 2-107 deals with for-
92 See supra text accompanying note 38. 
93 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(B)(2). 
94 N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 4. 
95 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 2-103(C)-(D), 2-106, 2-107, 2-110(A)(3), 3-102, 4-
101(C)(4), 5-103(A), 5-106(A); EC 2-8, 2-15 to -25, 2-32, 9-5. 
96 DR 2-110(A)(3) which is cited is relevant and has been dealt with extensively in this 
section. EC 9-5 is also cited and is also relevant, but simply states that "[s]eparation of the 
funds of a client from those of his lawyer not only serves to protect the client but also avoids 
even the appearance of impropriety, and therefore commingling of funds should be avoided." 
Model Code, supra note 4, EC 9-5. 
97 Id. DR 2-106. 
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warding fees,'® DR 3-102 with dividing fees with a non-lawyer," and 
DR 4-101 (C)(4) with a lawyer's revealing confidences or secrets to 
collect his fee.*°° Neither these nor the other sections cited have any 
bearing on the issue in question. 
B. The Legal Argument of Ownership 
N.Y. 570 argues that, as a matter of law, advance fee payments 
become the property of the lawyer upon receipt, and therefore "it 
strains the normal meaning of words to interpret the phrase 'funds of. 
clients' as embracing advance legal fees paid to the lawyer."'®' The 
argument based on legal ownership proceeds: 
Normally, when one pays in advance for services to be rendered or 
property to be delivered, ownership of the funds passes upon pay­
ment, absent an express agreement that the payment be held in 
trust or escrow, and notwithstanding the payee's obligation to per­
form or to refund the payment.'®^ 
The operative word in the quoted sentence is "normally." The law­
yer-client relationship is not a normal, arm's length business transac­
tion—it is a fiduciary relationship based on trust and loyalty.'®^ A 
lawyer who is legally entitled to his contractually provided fee under 
commercial law standards may not be entitled to the fee as a matter of 
fiduciary law.'®^ Whereas a homeowner who dismisses a painter with­
out just cause in the middle of a job is liable for breach of contract 
damages, a client who discharges his lawyer arbitrarily is not liable 
for contract damages,'®' but only for the value of the services actually 
98 Id. DR 2-107. 
99 Id. DR 3-102. 
100 Id. DR 4-101(C)(4). 
101 N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 4. 
102 Id. at 4-5. See also D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 3 ("Prepayments are commonly made for 
many other types of goods and services."). 
103 lawyer's duty is a high one which, because of the nature of the relationship 
that exists between an attorney and his client, embraces moral standards that are 
more stringent than those applicable to others. This duty, which is first assumed 
with the taking of the oath on admission to the bar, is not shed as long as one 
remains a member of the profession. 
Comment, supra note 40, at 1598 n.6 (quoting Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 518, 307 
A.2d 677, 682 (1973)). See also Meintod v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 
(1928) ("A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not hon­
esty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior."). 
lO'i In suing his client for collection of his fee, an attorney "urges the application of ordinary 
commercial laws. In light of the fiduciary obligation involved, the Court finds those rules 
inapplicable." Simon v. Metoyer, 383 So. 2d 1321, 1323 (La. Ct. App. 1980). See Spilker v. 
Hankin, 188 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1951); In re Swartz, 141 Ariz. 266, 273, 686 P.2d 1236, 
1243 (1984); C. Wolfram, supra note 2, § 4.1, at 147. 
A lawyer "cannot rely on the commercial laws to collect a fee that he has not entirely 
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rendered.'"  ̂ To seek to equate the lawyer-client relationship to the 
normal business relationship is to ignore the thrust of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility, which states that it is the "obligation of 
lawyers ... to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.'""  ̂
Further, it ignores the specific safeguards set forth in the Code to pre­
serve and protect client funds, by maintenance of records, safekeep­
ing, prompt refund, and deposit into a security account.'"® 
The attorney also does not possess sole ownership of the advance 
fee payment upon receipt because the attorney must return any 
unearned fees;'"® the client thus retains a continuing interest in these 
funds. Since fees are not earned until services are rendered,"" attor­
neys hold the advance fee payments in trust for the client until the 
services are performed and the fees are thereby earned.'" These 
funds are therefore "funds of clients" within the meaning of DR 9-
102(A), and under its terms must be deposited into a cUent trust 
account."  ̂
C. Policy Considerations 
Policy considerations strongly support the position that the de­
pository requirements for "funds of clients" apply to advance fee pay­
ments. Three distinct policy goals may be identified: (1) to preserve 
the client's property from the reach of the lawyer's creditors;"® (2) to 
preserve the client's property from possible misappropriation by the 
lawyer;"'' and (3) to enable the client to realistically dispute a fee 
where the funds are already in the lawyer's possession by disallowing 
a self-help resolution by the lawyer and instead preserving the dis­
puted funds intact until the dispute is resolved.'" 
The first pohcy goal is best effectuated by depositing the advance 
fee payment into a trust account. If a part of the advance fee has to be 
earned, due to his discharge by his client.... The contract provision concerning compensation 
is therefore unenforceable." Simon, 383 So. 2d at 1324. 
Martin v. Camp. 219 N.Y. 170, 174, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916). See supra note 73. 
'07 Model Code, supra note 4, Preamble. 
'08 Id. DR 2-110(AX3)-(A)(4); DR 9-102. 
'09 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 2-110(A)(3). See State v. Scott, 230 Kan. 564, 568, 639 
P.2d 1131, 1136 (1982); In re Martinez, 431 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. 1982); State Bar of Tex., 
supra note 9. 
"o Martin, 219 N.Y. at 176, 114 N.E. at 48; N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 1 n.l. 
"1 See Baranowski v. State Bar, 24 Cal. 3d 153, 164 n.4, 593 P.2d 613, 618 n.4, 154 Cal. 
Rptr. 752, 757 n.4 (1979). 
"2 See Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A). 
"3 See supra note 35. 
' '•• See supra text accompanying note 38. 
"3 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(AX2). 
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returned to the client, either because of termination"® or completion 
of services,"' it may no longer be available for return if deposited to 
the attorney's personal account and attached by the attorney's credi­
tors. If deposited to a security account, the funds are insulated from 
the reach of creditors."® 
The prophylactic policy goal of reducing the likelihood that cli­
ent funds will be misappropriated by the lawyer if commingled rather 
than deposited to a security account has been previously addressed."' 
The importance of this policy consideration is accentuated by empiri­
cal data on the causes of lawyer defalcation. In New York, the failure 
to return unearned fee advances constitutes a major disciplinary prob­
lem."® The Clients' Security Fund of New York (the "Fund"), which 
has been set up to compensate clients who have been defrauded by 
their lawyers, pays out a substantial percentage of its claims to com­
pensate "clients who paid legal fees in advance to attorneys who later 
abandoned them without completing the services they agreed to pro­
vide.""' Since the Fund's shortage of resources permits it to reim­
burse clients for only a small percentage of each legitimate claim filed, 
a requirement that advance fees be deposited to a security account"^ 
would not only reduce the misappropriation of client funds but would 
also increase the percentage of each supportable claim that could be 
repaid. The position advocated by N.Y. 570 would tend to increase 
misappropriation of client funds, decreasing the amount of each claim 
that a defrauded client could receive from the Fund."® 
The third policy goal is to protect a client's right to dispute a . 
fee—where the funds are in the attorney's possession—^by prohibiting 
116 Id. DR 2-110(A)(3); Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.5 comment. 
117 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(B)(4). 
118 See supra text accompanying notes 23-36. 
119 See supra text accompanying notes 37-46. 
120 "[c]laims seeking reimbursement for unearned legal fees comprise a substantial portion 
of [the Clients' Security Fund's] business, despite the fact that the actual monetary losses in­
volved are relatively small compared to other losses." Letter to Professor Lester Brickman 
from Frederick Miller, Executive Director and Counsel of The Clients' Security Fund of New 
York (Apr. 23, 1986). Since 1982, more than 51% of all claims filed with the Fund involved 
attorneys who kept unearned legal fees. The Clients' Security Fund of the State of New York, 
1987 Annual Report 13 (1988). In 1986, unearned legal fees were the leading cause of claims, 
comprising 127 of the 341 claims received that year. The Clients' Security Fund of the State of 
New York, 1986 Annual Report 12 (1987). 
171 Letter to Professor Brickman, supra note 120. 
172 Periodic audits would increase the efiicacy of the requirement. See supra note 46. 
173 A nonscientific survey by the author indicated that most attorneys deposit advance fee 
payments to their personal accounts. Indeed, attorneys were surprised to leam that there was 
even an issue regarding the propriety of that deposit. This may account for why such a high 
percentage of claims paid by the Fund is for advance fees paid to lawyers who do not complete 
the work for which they were retained. 
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the attorney from withdrawing the funds representing his fee from the 
security account until the dispute is resolved.'^'* N.Y. 570 speaks di­
rectly to this goal: 
[T]he very reason that many lawyers require advance fee payments 
in the first place is so that they will not be subject to a client's 
refusal to pay for legal services after they are rendered. If fee ad­
vances were required to be deposited in a client trust account, it 
would follow that this purpose of requiring advance payment could 
be easily defeated by a chent who, after services are rendered, dis­
putes a justly earned fee. Under DR 9-102(A)(2), the disputed 
portion of the fee would have to be retained in the client trust ac­
count, and would not be available to the lawyer, until the dispute 
was resolved.'^' 
Precisely. The trust requirement imposed by DR 9-102(A) frus­
trates an underlying purpose of the advance fee: to weight the finan­
cial relationship between lawyer and client in favor of the lawyer.'^® 
DR 9-102(A), in effectuating the fiduciary nature of the relationship, 
places the interests of the client paramount. The burden is on the 
attorney to resolve a fee dispute since he cannot withdraw the funds 
until the dispute is resolved. The implicit message of N.Y. 570 is that 
to avoid this protection afforded the client, lawyers should obtain ad­
vance fee payments and deposit them to their general accounts. Thus, 
the burden in any fee dispute would be shifted to the client. The pol­
icy of N.Y. 570 is the diametric of the fiduciary policy articulated in 
DR 9-102 (and repeated with even greater emphasis in the Model 
Rules).'" 
Similar to N.Y. 570's policy position is the District of Columbia 
Bar's argument that the additional accounting burdens and costs in­
curred by attorneys if advance payments must be deposited to client 
trust accounts favor the placement of these fees in the attorney's office 
account.'^® DR 9-102(B)(3) requires detailed record keeping for all 
"funds, securities, or other properties" of the client received by the 
attorney.'^' Further, the District of Columbia bar argues that interest 
>24 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(A)(2). 
>25 N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 5 (footnote omitted). Of. D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 2-3 
("Typically, lawyers seek fee advances when dealing with clients where no established relation­
ship exists, where a client's past behavior raises concern about promptness of future payment 
or where substantial legal work will occur at the outset."). 
>26 D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 6-7 (The objective of the fee advance is to "take the attorney 
away from the financial mercies of the client."). 
>27 "[A.] lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's [fee] con­
tention. The disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust. . .." Model Rules, supra 
note 4, Rule 1.15 comment. 
>28 See D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 7-8. 
>29 Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102(B)(3). The Fund recommended that the courts 
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earned on these trust accounts also creates "burdensome accounting 
problems" which the minority contend will cause exasperated at­
torneys and clients "to place the funds in non-interest bearing ac­
counts, benefitting only the bank."^^* However, the practice of 
depositing 
advanced fees into the 9-102 trust account and . . . self-restraint as 
to the use of fees until they are earned would not impose significant 
burdens upon attorneys in light of DR 9-102(A)(2) which provides 
that those portions of funds so deposited may be withdrawn by the 
attorney when due unless the right to receive those funds is dis­
puted by the client. The only real burden imposed upon the attor­
ney in such a case involves some additional bookkeeping. . . . 
[A]dditional bookkeeping is a necessary burden of the profession. 
In light of the harm to the profession and the public caused by the 
loss of clients' funds and by the mere appearance of impropriety, it 
is a relatively small burden for the profession to bear.^^^ 
In addition to bookkeeping burdens, the minority position argues that 
the existence of clients' security funds"^ supports their view—an ar­
gument akin to condoning bank robbery because banks are insured. 
D. Tax Consequences 
Although N.Y. 570's authors declined to consider the tax conse­
quences of their decision,'^' the different tax treatments under the ma-
adopt statewide banking and record keeping rules for members of the New York bar. See 1986 
Annual Report, supra note 120, at 21. 
130 D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 7. 
131 Id. at 8. In today's world of computerized bookkeeping, allocating interest among the 
various client moneys in a security account presents little difficulty. Moreover, the issue will 
only be significant if large sums are involved. In that circumstance, there should be a clear 
understanding with the client as to who is entitled to the interest generated. 
132 State Bar of Tex., supra note 9, at 10. See D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 8-9 (dissent); 
Miller, Lawyer: Fiduciary, Accountant, Archivist, 58 N.Y. St. B.J. 15, 17 (1986). 
133 Clients' security funds have been established in many jurisdictions to compensate ag­
grieved clients for the dishonest actions of their lawyers. The funds were created "to promote 
public confidence in the administration of justice and the integrity of the legal profession by 
reimbursing losses caused by the dishonest conduct of attorneys . . . ." 1986 Annual Report, 
supra note 120, at 4. See generally Comment, supra note 39, at 424-32 (goals of fund). 
134 See D.C. Bar, supra note 15, at 7. Since these funds will partially compensate the vic­
timized client, the minority is satisfied that these funds will make amends for a dishonest 
lawyer's behavior or the inconvenience to the client of having to pursue fee reimbursement in 
court. Since 1982, however. New York's Clients' Security Fund has only reimbursed 986 
claimants out of 1500 processed claims. The disbursements totalled $3,957,544, but the losses 
exceeded $7,000,000. 1986 Annual Report, supra note 120, at 1. Further, because attorneys 
are fiduciaries, see supra note 1 and accompanying text, clients should not have to pursue their 
attorneys in court for the return of unearned fees. Thus, the minority's reliance on clients' 
security funds is misplaced. 
135 N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 7 n.6. 
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jority and minority positions justify such consideration. If deposited 
to a trust account, advance fee payments are not income for federal 
tax purposes until undisputedly earned; but if deposited to an attor­
ney's account, the advances are income immediately.'̂ ® The Tax 
Court reached this conclusion in Miele v. Commissioner,̂ '̂' determin­
ing that "whether the law firm was in receipt of income when the 
prepaid legal fees were received by it. . . . depend[ed] upon whether 
the firm received the fees under a claim of right and without restric­
tion as to their disposition.""® By analyzing the requirements of the 
Pennsylvania Code of Professional Responsibility section governing 
client funds and property,"' the court concluded that under Penn­
sylvania law governing attorneys, "prepaid legal fees received by the 
firm are to be treated as owned by the client until an undisputed 
amount is due the firm.'"  ̂ The court next reasoned that "the prohi­
bition against commingling these funds with the law firm's and re­
strictions upon use until an undisputed amount is due clearly indicate 
the firm did not receive these funds under a claim of right and without 
substantial restriction as to disposition.'"'*' Consequently, advance 
payments of legal fees are not income when actually received, but 
when undisputedly earned.'*  ̂
Thus, by stating that prepaid legal fees are not client funds that 
require placement in a trust account unless there is an agreement by 
the lawyer and client to the contrary,'*® the New York State Bar As­
sociation Committee on Professional Ethics has eflfectively required 
that New York attorneys treat advance fee payments as income upon 
receipt. Therefore, if the client exercises his right to terminate the 
relationship before the fee is earned, and that occurs in the tax year 
following receipt, tax liabilities would be generated that could not be 
136 Miele v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 284 (1979). In Miele, a Pennsylvania law firm (tax­
payer) followed the majority position and deposited all advance payments for legal fees in 
client trust accounts. Id. at 285. 
137 Id. at 284. 
138 Id. at 289 (citing North Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932)). 
139 Id. at 289-90. That section, Pennsylvania Code of Professional Responsibility Discipli­
nary Rule 9-102, is textually identical to Model Code, supra note 4, DR 9-102. 
140 Miele, 72 T.C. at 290. 
Ill Id. 
142 The Miele court also held that advance fee payments are "constructively received" when 
earned even if the funds are not removed from the trust account. Id. at 290-91. 
1^3 N.Y. 570 opines that advance fee payments are the attorney's property when received, 
but it permits the attorney and client to contract that the prepayment is the client's property. 
N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 6-7. If the attorney and client do agree that the advance fee is the 
client's property and therefore, under DR 9-102, must be deposited to a client trust account, 
the advance fee would not be treated as income until undisputedly earned by the attorney. 
This agreement is effective for tax purposes even though the attorney's sole motivation for 
entering it is for tax deferral purposes. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). 
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oflFset until the next year. The majority position, of course, avoids this 
inconvenience for the lawyer. 
E. N.Y. 570 and Fiduciary Law 
Whether an advance fee payment is to be deposited to a security 
account or to a personal account has been determined by all of the 
commenting bar associations, except N.Y. 570, to be a binary deci­
sion. It must go into one or the other. If the advance fee is not 
"funds of clients" but rather the attorney's money, then a supercau-
tious lawyer seeking to be scrupulous would be guilty of commingling 
if he deposited the advance fee to his trust account. To avoid this 
either/or situation and presumably to give the lawyer control over his 
income flow for federal tax purposes, N.Y. 570 essentially gives the 
lawyer the option. The advance fee is not "funds of clients" unless 
the lawyer entered into an agreement with the client "to treat the 
advance payments or legal fees as client funds and deposit them in a 
client trust account."^'^ The client willing to pay an advance fee to 
retain the lawyer—without designating the sum as "funds of clients" 
for purposes of DR 9-102(A)—will of course be willing to agree, at 
the lawyer's request, that they be denominated as "funds of clients" if 
that suits the lawyer. 
This "best of both worlds" approach to advance fees omits an 
important element. Since the lawyer is a fiduciary for the client,'^' 
and since the client typically does not comprehend the significance of 
the "funds of clients" designation, which is for the benefit of the law­
yer at the client's expense, it is the fiduciary duty of the lawyer, in 
presenting the retainer agreement, to explain to the client the signifi­
cance of the distinction."^^ Specifically, the client would have to be 
told that if he agreed to designate the funds as the lawyer's own, then 
he would be forfeiting the protection afforded him by DR 9-102(A)(2) 
144 N.Y. 570, supra note 21, at 2. 
145 See Rosner v. Paley, 65 N.Y.2d 736, 492 N.Y.S.2d 13, 481 N.E.2d 553 (1985); C. Wolf­
ram, supra note 2, § 4.1, at 146-47. 
146 Model Code, supra note 4, EC 5-7, 7-8, 2-20; Florida Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145, 
146-49 (Fla. 1975); Robinson v. Sharp, 201 111. 86, 66 N.E. 299 (1903); Moran v. Simpson, 42 
N.D. 575, 173 N.W. 769 (1919); 2 E. Thornton, A Treatise on Attorneys at Law § 429, at 743 
(1914) ("Attorneys, in entering into contracts of employment with clients, are required to 
exercise the highest order of good faith . . . disclosing all information ... as to facts which 
would or might influence him either in entering into, or refusing to execute, the contract."); 
N.Y. State Bar, Op. 569 (1985); N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, 
Op. 371 (1945); cf. Klein v. First Edina Nat'l Bank, 293 Minn. 481, 481, 196 N.W.2d 619, 622 
(1972) (per curiam) (where bank knows customer is placing trust and confidence in it, bank 
has special duty to counsel and inform customer of all material facts, including bank's 
motives). 
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with regard to disputing the fee.'"*' Further, fiduciary law would re­
quire that the now fully informed chent be given the option of 
designating the funds as "funds of chents" or the lawyer's own."*® A 
client who "willingly" exercises his option to designate the funds as 
the lawyer's own is almost certainly uninformed.*'*' 
Therefore, even if the New York State Bar Association Commit­
tee on Professional Ethics elects to retain N.Y. 570, it is bound to 
rectify its incomplete opinion by addition of the fiduciary require­
ments enumeratwi above. 
IV. THE MODEL RULES COMPARED 
In 1983, the American Bar Association replaced the Code with 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules").Although 
New York has rejected the Rules,*'* an examination of the Rules with 
regard to advance fee payments is relevant and confirms the conclu­
sion that both under the Model Rules and Model Code, advance fee 
payments are to be deposited to a trust account. In form, the Rules 
follow a "Restatement of the Law" format. Research notes follow 
each new rule, comparing that rule with its counterpart in the Code. 
147 See Jacobson v. Sassower, 66 N.Y.2d 991, 993, 489 N.E.2d 1283, 1284, 499 N.Y.S.2d 
381, 382 (1985). 
148 Arguably, failure to do so would violate DR 1-102(A)(2) which prohibits a lawyer from 
"circumventpng] a Disciplinary Rule through action of another." Model Code, supra note 4, 
DR 9-102(A)(2). In this case, the lawyer would be using the uninformed client to enable the 
lawyer to circumvent the requirements of DR 9-102(A)(2). 
149 Sec Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d 107, 113 (W. Va. 1986). A 
client who agrees to pay a contingent fee exceeding the risk of no recovery—though he can 
afford to pay an hourly fee, has been informed of the hourly fee choice, and presented with the 
risk—has probably not understood the discussion of risk and has not given his "fully informed 
consent." In a "contingent-fee contract [t]he client needs to be fully informed as to the degree 
of risk justifying a contingent fee." Id. at 113. See Florida Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145, 148 
(Fla. 1975): In re Kutner, 78 111. 2d 157, 35 111. Dec. 157, 399 N.E.2d 963 (1979); Wunschel 
Law Firm v. Clabough, 291 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Iowa 1980); Cooper & Keys v. Bell, 127 Tenn. 
142, 153 S.W. 844 (1912); Cal. Rule 2-107(B)(9) ("[t]he informed consent of the client to the 
fee agreement"); cf. Schenck v. Hill, Lent & Troescher, N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1988, at 30, col. 3 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 11, 1988). In Schenck, a lawyer hired to sue another lawyer for malprac­
tice was Wmself a potential defendant in the same action, and obtained client consent to waive 
the conflict of interest. In disqualifying the lawyer, the court said: "the consent obtained in 
this case does not reflect a full understanding of the legal rights being waived. . . . [T]he 
unsophisticated client, relying upon the confidential relationship with his lawyer, may not be 
regarded as able to understand the ramifications of the conflict, however much explained to 
him." Id. 
150 Model Rules, supra note 4. 
isi The New York State Bar Association has rejected proposing that the appellate divisions 
adopt the Model Rules. See Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct, Current Reports (ABA/BNA) 77 
(Mar. 16, 1988). Further, the presiding justices of the appellate division have indicated that 
they will not act contrary to the position taken by the Bar Association. Wise, State Bar Dele­
gates Refuse to Adopt New Conduct Rules, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 1985, col. 3, at 1. 
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Where a rule deviates from the Code the "Model Code Comparison" 
states the deviation; where no change is noted, the Rules, though us­
ing different language, are not deviating from the Code's position on 
that subject. 
Rule 1.15(a), the Rules' counterpart to DR 9-102(A), states in 
pertinent part: 
A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is 
in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation sepa­
rate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a sep­
arate account maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is 
situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third per­
son. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately 
safeguarded. . . 
In commenting on the legal background of Rule 1.15, the draft­
ers stated that "[f]unds are often given to a lawyer for payment of 
costs or as an advance from which fees may be drawn when 
earned.'"®^ This strongly infers that the drafters intended that ad­
vance fees are "property of chents ... in a lawyer's possession" and 
are to be held "separate from the lawyer's own property, and if this 
property consists of funds, then these "[f]unds shall be kept in a sepa­
rate account. . . Since these advance fees are to be "drawn when 
earned," they cannot be deposited to the lawyer's general office or 
personal account because they would immediately lose this separate 
identity. The only way in which advance fees may be "drawn when 
earned" is if they are deposited into a security account. Since the 
Model Rules, in the "Code Comparison" to Rule 1.15,''' do not indi­
cate that it is changing the Code by providing that advance fee pay­
ments are to be deposited to a security account, it is confirming that 
the drafters of the Model Rules regarded the Model Code as provid­
ing that the depository requirements for "funds of clients" also apply 
to advance fee payments—^that is, that "funds of clients" include ad­
vance fee payments."® 
'52 Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct (ABA) Rule 1.15(a), at 164 (1984). 
153 Id. at 168. 
154 Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.15(a). 
155 The Model Code Comparison states that Rule 1.15(a) modifies DR 9-102(A) by requir­
ing funds of third parties to be separately maintained in addition to clients' funds. The Com­
parison states no other policy changes. 
156 In one of the Rules' earlier proposed drafts, the Legal Background section stated that 
Rule 1.15(a) does not apply to unearned advance fees. ABA Proposed Final Draft, Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct ICQ (May 30, 1981). This statement was removed from the 
proposed final draft of the Rules. One reason for the comment's removal was probably be­
cause the only authority cited as support for the comment failed to support it. The source, a 
student Comment, stated that "DR 9-102(A) ... is ambiguotts as to whether fees paid in 
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CONCLUSION 
Whether viewed from a textual, legal, or policy perspective, the 
position of N.Y. 570 and the other adherents of the minority position 
is indefensible. It is inconsistent with the text of the Code of Profes­
sional Responsibility and of the Rules of Professional Conduct; it 
seeks to replace fiduciary law with commercial law to govern the at­
torney-client relationship; and it accentuates the likelihood of loss of 
chent funds at a time when the losses sustained by advance fee paying 
chents aggregate as much or more than all other categories of client 
loss. In seeking to elevate the interests of the attorney above those of 
the cUent, it runs counter to the very purposes of the Code of Profes­
sional Responsibility and the Rules of Professional Conduct. Even 
the features of the minority position that may be attractive to some 
lawyers because they ostensibly "protect" the lawyer by offering him 
a way around the Code- and Rule-mandated protections for the cli­
ent, are little more than a snare and a delusion. The minority position 
raises attorneys' chances of being disciplined for failing to promptly 
return any unearned fee payments in violation of DR 2-110(A)(3), it 
increases the likelihood of commingling funds and of misappropria­
tion or unintentional embezzlement by attorneys, and it enlarges at­
torneys' exposure to hability due to loss of the funds. Additionally, 
attorneys in states adopting the minority view may be subjected to less 
favorable tax treatment. Accordingly, the New York Committee on 
Professional Ethics and other adherents of the minority view should 
reconsider their determination that advance fee payments are not 
"fimds of clients" within the ambit of DR 9-102, and should declare 
that advance fee payments must be deposited to client security ac­
counts and withdrawn only when indisputably earned. 
advance for specific services yet to be performed continue to belong to the client until the 
attorney performs the services." Comment, supra note 39, at 437 (footnotes omitted; emphasis 
added). The note cited Carpenter, supra note 39, at 340 ("It has been suggested that [advance 
fees] should always be held in a segregated trust account, but DR 9-102 does not make this 
clear."). Since this Legal Background Section comment was omitted from the final proposed 
draft of the Rules, it may reasonably be concluded that the drafters rejected the view that the 
Model Code did not include advance fee payments within the ambit of "funds of clients," as 
well as the view that the Model Rules should fail to follow the Model Code's position on 
advance fees. 
